Monthly Archive for March, 2011

From Jim Giles, naturenews

How can we persuade people to look after their health? Why do moods spread like a contagion? How can humanity increase its collective wisdom?

These are some of the most pressing questions that social scientists should tackle, according to a group of leading scholars in the field who hope that their ‘top ten’ list will help shape the thinking of researchers and funding bodies for decades to come.

In a parallel effort, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) last week unveiled the results of its own agenda-setting exercise, which asked social scientists to identify “grand challenge questions that are both foundational and transformative”.

Both groups say that they ran the exercises because they wanted researchers to step back from immediate research priorities and identify the most significant problems in their field. The results demonstrate the growing ambition of the social sciences to tackle difficult issues in a quantitative way, addressing problems from equality and wages to wars and health.

The ‘top ten’ approach was inspired by a list of 23 major unsolved questions compiled by the mathematician David Hilbert in 1900. The Hilbert problems helped to focus the attention of mathematicians throughout the following century. “He laid out the road map for twentieth-century math,” says Nick Nash, a vice-president at General Atlantic, an investment firm based in Greenwich, Connecticut. “What if we had a road map for other disciplines?”

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From Daniel, Discover

I’ve been on somewhat of an unintended hiatus for the past few months, as I try to wrap up some projects, and deal with a few other things in my life. However, I just read something that has given me a kick in the pants. And I don’t mean that in a good way. In late December there was an article by Jonah Lehrer in the New Yorker titled “The truth wears off”. Much more suggestive was the subtitle, “Is there something wrong with the scientific method?”. The story discusses the “decline effect”: an article is published with startling results, and then subsequent work finds increasingly diminished evidence for the initial unexpected result. It’s as if there’s “cosmic habituation”, with the Universe conspiring to make a surprising result go away with time. The last paragraph sums things up:

The decline effect is troubling because it reminds us how difficult it is to prove anything. We like to pretend that our experiments define the truth for us. But that’s often not the case. Just because an idea is true doesn’t mean it can be proved. And just because an idea can be proved doesn’t mean it’s true. When the experiments are done, we still have to choose what to believe.

I don’t particularly disagree with any of this. But it’s completely besides the point, and to untutored ears can be immensely misleading. The article is a perfect example of precisely the effect it seeks to describe (there must be a catchy word for this? Intellectual onomatopoeia?). The article gives a few examples of people finding interesting results, only to have them disappear on sustained scrutiny. It makes it sound like there is an epidemic of declining confidence:

One of the first demonstrations of this mysterious phenomenon came in the early nineteen-thirties. Joseph Banks Rhine, a psychologist at Duke, had developed an interest in the possibility of extrasensory perception, or E.S.P. Rhine devised an experiment featuring Zener cards, a special deck of twenty-five cards printed with one of five different symbols: a card was drawn from the deck and the subject was asked to guess the symbol. Most of Rhine’s subjects guessed about twenty per cent of the cards correctly, as you’d expect, but an undergraduate named Adam Linzmayer averaged nearly fifty per cent during his initial sessions, and pulled off several uncanny streaks, such as guessing nine cards in a row. The odds of this happening by chance are about one in two million. Linzmayer did it three times.

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Dan Sperber

From Dan Sperber

There are several approaches in the social sciences that seek to provide causal explanations of social phenomena neither in terms of general causal laws nor in terms of case-specific narratives, but, at a middle level of generality, in terms of recurrent causal patterns or “mechanisms” (Hedström & Swedberg 1988). Typically, these approaches invoke micro-mechanisms to explain macro social phenomena. Most of them, ‘analytical sociology’ in particular (Hedström 2005), are versions or offshoots of methodological individualism. These individualistic approaches either stick to the “methodological” in “methodological individualism” and leave aside ontological issues, or else they are also individualistic in the metaphysical sense and deny the existence of supra-individual social phenomena that cannot be analysed in terms of the aggregation of individual actions (see Ruben 1985).

The ontological challenge to which individualism responds is that presented by holistic approaches that place the social on a supra-individual level of reality. Another possible challenge, coming not from above but from below, that is, from the natural sciences, is generally not considered. The individuals invoked in individualism are not so much the individual organisms recognised in biology as the individual agents recognised in commonsense ontology. Individual agency is taken as a primitive in this approach, rather than as a tentative construct that should be unpacked and possibly questioned by psychology and biology.

Most mechanistic approaches, whether their individualism is just methodological or also metaphysical, show little interest in providing the social sciences with a naturalistic ontology, that is, one continuous with that of the natural science. The main goal of this chapter is to outline such a naturalistic ontology. But why should we want such an ontology in the first place? I don’t, by the way, believe that the social sciences in general should systematically work within naturalistic ontology: many of their goals, concern and programs are better pursued with the usual commonsense ontology. But when it comes to providing a scientific causal explanation of social phenomena, there are at least two reasons to prefer a naturalistic approach. The first reason is trivial: To the extent that it is possible, we would prefer our understanding of the world to be integrated, both for the sake of generality and for that of coherence.

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